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Thirty years after the passage of the Toxic Substances 
Control Act (henceforth TSCA) in the United States, the 
European Union adopted in December 2006 a set of 
far-reaching controls over substances produced by the 
chemical industry. Like the TSCA, this regulation on the 
“registration, evaluation, authorization and restriction 
of chemicals (REACH)” is intended to regulate several 
thousands of chemical substances.(1) REACH and the 
TSCA are frequently likened to each other, in particular 
with regard to their scope. However REACH differs 
significantly because it places on firms the task of 
producing information on molecules and their risks 
(JOUZEL & LASCOUMES 2011).
The TSCA is one of the most ambitious laws ever 
imagined for controlling toxic substances. Signed by 
President Gerald Ford in October 1976, it was the 
first regulatory instrument with the intent of controlling 
(1)  Regulation (EC) No. 1907/2006 of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 18 December 2006 concerning the Regis-
tration, Evaluation, Authorization and Restriction of Chemicals 
(REACH), establishing a European Chemicals Agency.
several thousands of chemicals through its procedures 
of registration, assessment and prohibition. To apply this 
law, the Environmental Protection Agency (henceforth 
EPA) has been assigned the task of identifying, for 
control by federal authorities, the chemicals present 
on the market. The TSCA authorizes the EPA to collect 
information on the production, uses and harmful effects 
of chemicals already on the market. It also enables the 
EPA to propose requirements for companies to conduct 
additional studies and tests, in certain cases, when 
the information provided to the agency is insufficient. 
This act also has a procedure for handling requests 
for placing new chemicals on the market. If the 
EPA manages to determine that a chemical has 
“unreasonable” risks for health or the environment, its 
duty is to take the necessary steps to reduce these 
risks.
Although REACH and the TSCA are frequently likened 
to each other, the American act has been a regulatory 
failure in the opinion of several analysts (O’REILLY 
2010; VOGEL & ROBERTS 2011). The EPA has 
How to control high-risk substances despite the absence, lack or confidentiality of the data 
available (but unequally so) to authorities and companies? Starting with the US Toxic Substances 
Control Act of 1976, the difficulties are pointed out that public authorities have encountered 
while trying to control the thousands of chemicals on the market. For a long time in both the 
United States and European Union, a stalemate arose out of the asymmetry of information 
between regulatory authorities and firms. The EU’s REACH regulation, adopted in 2006, has 
lifted this blockage. Its authorization procedure enables authorities to regulate dangerous 
molecules without new data by placing on firms the burden of proving that they control health 
risks and that the chemicals deemed essential to their business have socioeconomic benefits. 
REACH thus deploys a new form of regulation for high-risk chemicals owing, in particular, to its 
“prohibition through authorization”, which prefers a gradual withdrawal of toxic substances from 
the marketplace to outright prohibition.
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prohibited only five chemical agents under this act 
since its adoption: PCBs, chlorofluorocarbons, dioxin, 
asbestos and hexavalent chromium. Furthermore, the 
courts overturned the ban on asbestos less than two 
years after it was issued. The EPA has not prohibited 
more substances because it lacks the authority for 
requiring manufacturers to carry out additional scientific 
studies or for making the concept of “unreasonable 
risk” operational. Whether referring to information 
management (KOCH & ASHFORD 2006), the 
precautionary principle (KARLSSON 2010, VOGEL 
2012) or a systematic comparison of the TSCA and 
REACH (APPLEGATE 2008), critics have tended to 
be unanimous: the TSCA has failed, whereas REACH 
is said to be both an opportunity for innovation and 
a “new paradigm” for managing chemicals (FUCHS 
2009), even though attention has also been drawn to 
its negative economic effects (CATOIRE et al. 2012).
How has the EU regulation been able to control 
dangerous chemicals while the TSCA has failed? 
The hypothesis explored herein is that new “ways 
of regulating drugs” (GAUDILLIÈRE & HESS 2012; 
GAUDILLIÈRE & JOLY 2006) are part of a shift from 
an administrative to an industrial regulation. For a 
long time, administrative authorities were in charge 
of controlling toxic substances through government 
agencies that had to do most of the work of expertise 
and decision-making. In contrast, firms play a key role 
in regulatory procedures of an industrial type. Herein, 
I would like to explain how this shift in EU policy-making, 
thanks to a new control procedure (authorization), has 
reconfigured the relations between public authorities 
and firms.
This article(2) relies on research conducted between 
2011 and 2014 for a doctoral dissertation (BOULLIER 
2016a). Data were collected using three classical 
methods of research in the social sciences: 
semidirective interviews, observation (participant as 
well as nonparticipant) and the analysis of documents 
from the archives (in particular the working papers 
during the drafting of REACH). My remarks on the TSCA 
are based on interviews with former EPA employees 
and on the archives of the National Service Center 
for Environmental Publications, which manages EPA 
publications and reports. As for the filiation between 
REACH and the TSCA, I have drawn on the findings 
of two case studies wherein I traced the regulatory 
circuits of several molecules in the process of being 
(2)  This article has been translated from French by Noal Mellott 
(Omaha Beach, France), who would like to quote from recital 72 
of REACH, which is highly relevant to the reading of this article: 
“To support the aim of eventual replacement of substances of very 
high concern by suitable alternative substances or technologies, 
all applicants for authorization should provide an analysis of alter-
natives considering their risks and the technical and economic fea-
sibility of substitution, including information on any research and 
development the applicant is undertaking or intends to undertake. 
Furthermore, authorizations should be subject to time-limited re-
view whose periods would be determined on a case-by-case basis 
and normally be subject to conditions, including monitoring.” The 
intent expressed in this recital is reformulated in article 60. Texts 
of European Union law are available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/FR/TXT/?uri=CE-
LEX%3A02006R1907-20140410.
prohibited, in particular, the well-known plasticizer, 
bis(2-ethylhexyl) phthalate (DEHP).
Although the regulatory procedures of both the TSCA 
and REACH suggest a similarity, the way chemicals are 
regulated in the EU has deeply changed. After recalling 
how industrial chemicals are regulated in the United 
States, the filiation between the two sets of regula-
tions will be described along with the innovations made 
under REACH, notedly its “prohibition through authori-
zation”. Firms play a key role in this new approach on 
the borderline between administrative and industrial 
forms of regulation.
The EPA, firms and the lack of data
In the 1960s, American authorities started using a multi-
disciplinary (instead of a sectoral) approach to address 
the issue of dangerous chemicals. Till then, the only 
arrangements for controlling chemicals targeted their 
uses as pesticides (the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, 
and Rodenticide Act of 1910) or drugs (the Federal 
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938). At the time, 
no government agency was responsible for managing 
environmental pollution as such, nor for handling the 
public health problems caused by pollution. Three major 
factors led to the TSCA: an increasing politicization of 
environmental issues, the priority given by President 
Nixon to rationalizing federal agencies and, coming out 
of all this, the creation of the EPA.
Managing toxic substances regardless of the 
source
Prior to the EPA, the federal government had very few 
programs on the environment. The existing programs 
were unevenly applied, owing to a lack of coordina-
tion among the federal agencies in charge. During the 
1960s, more and more questions were being raised 
about toxic substances in the environment. Rachel 
Carson’s Silent Spring (1962) sounded the alarm and 
catalyzed concern. Meanwhile, several persons who 
would be involved in drafting the TSCA pointed out 
the reasons why the federal government was unable 
to manage pollution. The question of making a reform 
arose. J. Clarence “Terry” Davies, one of the first 
persons to imagine such a reform, would help draft 
the bill of law. His career, which had started by sharing 
time between Princeton University and various federal 
offices, is a guideline for tracing the evolution of the 
TSCA during its initial years.
It all started in the mid-1960s when Davies joined the 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB, part of the 
Executive Office of President of the United States), 
responsible for drafting the federal budget. The OMB 
also sees to it that other government services comply 
with the presidential policies; its employees examine 
how government agencies carry out federal programs. 
After two years devoted to assessing environmen-
tal programs, Davies wrote a book drawn from his 
experience in the OMB (DAVIES & DAVIES 1970). 
Focused on federal programs related to pollution and 
toxic substances, this book would soon bring him back 
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to Washington. In the last chapter, he raised questions 
about environmental programs. What objectives should 
they have? What sort of reform would enable the federal 
government to control the multitude of toxic substances 
present in the human body and environment?
Davies formulated two proposals for controlling chemi-
cals on the American market. The first was to set up 
a federal agency in charge of managing pollution 
regardless of its source. No one had previously seen 
pollution as a problem to be handled across the board. 
The US Public Health Service was in charge of air 
pollution; and the Department of Interior, of water pollu-
tion, while several government services and agencies 
handled health problems related to radiation or 
workplace safety without any of them actually being in 
charge. Davies’ second proposal was to institutionalize, 
through new regulations, a procedure for the marketing 
of new chemicals.
As an expert on environmental policy, Davies soon 
joined a group working on how to reduce the number 
of federal agencies responsible for environmental, 
agricultural and social policies. The group’s first idea 
was to set up a Department of Natural Resources 
to include the departments of Agriculture and of the 
Interior and, too, the services in charge of Health, 
Education and Social Services. Davies was not 
convinced of this proposal’s relevance or feasibility. 
Along with Douglas Costle, who would later become the 
EPA’s first administrator, he drafted a counterproposal 
whereby the future agency was to be a commission 
with powers for handling environmental problems 
across the board: a sort of independent regulatory 
authority.
Meanwhile, President Nixon realized he did not have 
the advice he needed on pollution problems. He was 
not familiar with this topic, and it did not figure among 
his priorities. The opposition would badger him on this 
it during the 1972 election. Conditions were ripe in 
1970 for massively reorganizing the federal govern-
ment’s environmental programs. In a special message 
to Congress, Nixon called for creating an agency to 
control pollution of all sorts. The EPA was set up in 
December 1970, and talks on what would become the 
TSCA started in 1971.
Setting up the EPA was a major event that vindicated 
the position, adopted by Davies and Costle, about a 
single federal body to be in charge of toxic substances, 
whether in water, air or soil — an agency for control-
ling chemicals across the board. The agency now 
existed but without the power to regulate chemicals. 
Negotiations started on what would become, six years 
later, the Toxic Substances Control Act.
Preserving the asymmetry of information
From the start, the bill of law on toxic substances was 
a sensitive issue. Negotiations were thorny, as were 
the relations between Davies and Charles Lettow, a 
legal expert with whom Davies would write the bill’s 
first draft. Given their quite different careers (a political 
scientist from academia vs. a former employee of Dow 
Chemical Company), it was not evident that the two 
would get along.(3) Despite their variant approaches to, 
and perceptions of, chemicals, they drafted a bill of law 
based on two key principles in line with those for regula-
ting drugs and pesticides: a procedure for requesting 
permission to place chemicals on the market and a 
division of labor that placed the burden of proof on 
manufacturers. However this second principle — at the 
core of REACH — would be left out of the act passed 
by Congress.
Strong opposition from the Department of Commerce 
to the bill led the OMB (in charge of arbitrating 
disagreements) to take a closer look at this first 
version. Taking cognizance of the objections raised 
by Commerce, the OMB required that the two authors 
renegotiate the text with James Lynn, chief attorney 
at Commerce. Despite the principle of placing the 
burden of proof on industry, Lynn obtained that the 
EPA would have to bring proof of the negative 
physiological effects of chemicals by establishing 
causality based on a dose-effect relationship. As a 
consequence of this compromise, the asymmetry 
of information between authorities and firms went 
untouched.
Apart from political obstruction on Capitol Hill, other 
legal issues further complicated the quest for a 
compromise. It would take Congress six years before 
adopting the TSCA in 1976 — nearly the same duration 
that negotiations on REACH, thirty years later, lasted 
in Europe. Before taking effect, the TSCA had a 
poor reputation in the EPA, which saw it as being so 
flawed that some pundits nicknamed it the “Toxic 
Substances Conversation Act”.
The impossibility of prohibiting chemicals
The EPA office in charge of implementing the TSCA had 
a hard time during the first months following passage of 
the act. Under the law, the EPA was to compile, publish 
and update a list of all chemicals manufactured or used 
in the country. The first major difficulty was, therefore, 
to make this inventory, which would be used to identify 
and control new chemicals. At the time, the administra-
tors described this inventory work as a nightmare — at 
present, there are nearly seventy thousand chemicals 
on the list. This first feat, added to the organizatio-
nal difficulties of setting up a new office in a federal 
agency, was a challenge. But all this did not amount 
to much compared with what happened after Reagan 
(1981-1989) became president.
In a book on the controversies surrounding carcinoge-
nic chemicals, John D. Graham has described the 
difficult times endured by the EPA during the Reagan 
administration, in particular when Anne Gorsuch 
(1981-1983) and William Ruckelshaus (1983-1985) 
headed the agency (GRAHAM et al. 1988). Using 
similar data (which, by the way, have not changed much 
since then), the agency reached opposite conclusions, 
under Gorsuch then under Ruckelshaus, about the 
risks of cancer related to formaldehyde. The Gorsuch 
team was accused of being pro-industry. 
(3)  J. Clarence Davies interviewed by Jody Roberts and Kavita 
Hardy on 20 October 2009.
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These differences were partly at the origin of a Red Book 
on risk analysis published by the National Academy of 
Sciences. This publication led to deconstructing the 
hypothesis of a “pure” science owing to a shift, under 
risk analysis, from “reliance on facts to reliance on 
process” (JASANOFF 1992:202, JOLY 1999). The shift 
toward risk analysis covered up the key problem facing 
authorities: not enough data available were available 
on existing chemicals, and it was not possible to force 
firms to provide data.
The EPA’s unfortunate attempt to regulate asbestos 
in 1989 relied on risk analysis tools. This setback was 
evidence that it was nearly impossible for the agency to 
prohibit toxic chemicals or restrict their introduction on 
the market. After ten years of research, public meetings 
and investigations on the best regulatory approach to 
adopt for controlling chemicals, the EPA opted, under 
section 6 of the TSCA, for a gradual but total prohibi-
tion on manufacturing, importing, processing or distri-
buting asbestos. Challenged in the courts by a coali-
tion of manufacturers, this decision was overturned 
(STADLER 1992). In 1991, the court concluded that the 
EPA had not clearly stated whether “there is any other 
regulation that would achieve an acceptable level of risk 
as mandated by TSCA”; and that “the EPA, in its zeal 
to ban any and all asbestos products, basically ignored 
the cost side of the TSCA equation”.(4) The court’s ruling 
put an end de facto to the EPA’s recourse to section 
6 of the TSCA. No other action for prohibiting a toxic 
substance would be taken after this ruling.
Unable, for want of data, to assess the precise “uses” 
of toxic molecules, the EPA tried to use the TSCA to 
prohibit such chemicals regardless of their uses. But 
the courts, deeming such a prohibition to be too radical, 
deprived the agency of the only option that allowed 
for making the ultimate decision, namely prohibition. 
Following a period of “adversarial procedures” involving 
toxic chemicals (JASANOFF 1992), the EPA more or 
less gave up on regulating chemicals already on the 
market.
This brief history of the TSCA provides a glimpse of 
how, in the management of risky materials, the relations 
between regulatory authorities and firms have been 
reconfigured. The arrangements foreseen under the 
TSCA are similar to those the EU gradually adopted 
after 1970. The EU regulation adopted in 2006 has 
similar pretensions to the TSCA’s: REACH foresees, 
under a single regulation, procedures of registration, 
assessment and prohibition that apply to thousands 
of chemicals. But: the reversal of the burden of proof 
under REACH — from public authorities to manufactu-
rers — has fundamentally altered the management of 
dangerous molecules.
(4)  Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5t Cir. 1991). 
Available at http://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/
F2/947/1201/153685/ (consulted 17/6/17).
A new paradigm for managing toxic 
substances?
The idea of a far-reaching reform like REACH emerged 
in the late 1990s. Two major factors stimulated the 
process that would lead to the adoption of REACH in 
2006. For one thing, the European Commission was 
pursing a policy of rationalization, the “better law-ma-
king agreement”, which pushed toward assessing the 
effectiveness of EU directives and regulations and then 
decreasing the number thereof. For another, several 
member states were demanding reforms, through their 
ministers of the Environment to the Council of the Union. 
The reform of EU regulations targeting chemicals thus 
came to figure on the agenda.
REACH and the TSCA: Similar pretensions
According to a story on the origins of REACH, the 
process of reform was set in motion at a meeting of the 
ministers of the Environment of member states (speci-
fically, of the Council of the Union in its configuration 
“ministers of the Environment”) in 1998. Accordingly, 
the Council played a major role by insisting on gaps 
in the existing regulatory framework (EWALD 1986). 
One of the most important loopholes was the “burden 
of the past”:(5) firms were not under the obligation to 
systematically provide data on the toxicity of the tens of 
thousands of chemicals already on the market.
This meeting of ministers of the Environment led the 
European Commission to publish a report in 1998.(6) 
Presented to the Council, this report evaluated the 
operation of existing EU regulations on chemicals and 
identified shortcomings in risk management. In particu-
lar, regulation 793/93 “on the evaluation and control of 
the risks of existing substances” (i.e., substances placed 
on the market before 1981) was found to be wanting in 
matters of risk assessment. Out of the 110 substances 
listed as a priority in this regulation, only 19, according 
to the report, had been subjected to a full risk assess-
ment; and recommendations for reducing risks had 
been formulated for 14 of them. Bear in mind that the 
European inventory listed more than 100,000 chemi-
cals! Although the EU had not waited till the turn of 
the century to start controlling toxic substances, this 
concrete assessment of the application of the dozens 
of regulations and directives adopted since the end of 
the 1960s was overpowering.
Given this failure, the Commission decided to work on 
objectives for a future European strategy. The objectives 
set in REACH often enough remind us of the TSCA’s. 
There was, as already pointed out, the pretension to 
control several tens of thousands of toxic substances 
(5)  European Commission, “Industrial chemicals: burden of the 
past, challenge for the future”, A stakeholder workshop on the 
development of a future “chemicals” strategy for the European 
Union, Brussel, 24-25 February 1999, DOC XI/6337/99, April 
1999. Available at:
www.chemicalspolicy.org/downloads/Brainstorming-WRCRecom-
mendationscopy.pdf (consulted 17/6/17).
(6)  European Commission, “Report on the operation of directive 
67/548/EEC, directive 88/379/EEC, regulation 793/93 and 
directive 76/769/EEC, Brussels, 18 November 1998”.
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regardless of their sources. Like the TSCA, REACH 
was to draw up an inventory of chemicals, and assess 
and prohibit the most dangerous substances when the 
risks related to them could not be controlled.
Prohibit chemicals while authorizing uses
Let us insist that the European regulation is very 
similar to its American counterpart: its three underlying 
principles have to do with the registration and assess-
ment of the thousands of chemicals on the market and 
the prohibition of the most dangerous. Upon a closer 
look however, we notice that REACH foresees a new 
procedure, “authorization”, whereby authorities may 
prohibit dangerous chemicals — without any new 
data — on the grounds of their general properties. The 
chemicals thus declared “subject to authorization” are 
then prohibited, unless a temporary authorization to 
use them is granted, case by case, to a firm that files a 
request.
Before the adoption of REACH, it was hard to prohibit 
the most toxic molecules. Ten years after its adoption, 
168 chemicals figured on the “candidate list subject to 
authorization” at the start of 2016; and 31 of them were 
on the “list subject to authorization”. No other procedure 
for controlling chemicals has achieved such a result, 
moreover, in such a short time.(7) To understand how 
this procedure works, let us look at a concrete example.
The case of DEHP clearly illustrates how REACH 
prohibits chemicals that used to lie beyond the reach of 
regulatory authorities. Used as a plasticizer, bis(2-ethyl-
hexyl) phthalate (more often known as DEHP) is 
omnipresent in everyday life. It was synthesized for the 
first time in the 1920s, and produced on a large commer-
cial scale during the 1930s. Given its low production 
costs and many applications, it is one of the most 
widespread phtalates. Many manufactured products 
contain DEHP: shower curtains, electric cables, toys, 
vinyl floor coverings and, too, the bags used for blood 
and for dialysis and even sex toys.
Despite the risks related to its uses and the high risk 
of exposure, DEHP was subject to few controls till 
quite recently. Like many other products, it took a long 
time before this molecule was recognized as “toxic for 
reproduction” and classified in consequence. Although 
studies proving its toxicity date back to the 1980s 
(THOMAS et al. 1984), DEHP would not be classified 
as “probably” toxic till the turn of the century. According 
to the studies serving as the grounds for this decision, 
DEHP carries risks for human fertility (especially to 
children) owing to its properties as an endocrine disrup-
tor. Given the large volumes produced, this phthalate 
was subjected to a risk assessment by EU authorities — 
an additional document to add onto the large number of 
previous studies. Despite all this evidence, this dange-
rous, extremely widespread chemical, omnipresent in 
many everyday products, was still beyond the reach of 
(7)  However the scope of this authorization is “moderate” in the 
words of one interviewee, a former European chemical industry 
representative who took part in preliminary negotiations on 
REACH. Approximately 1,500 chemicals could be targeted among 
the 100,000 in circulation (BOULLIER & LAURENT 2015).
the law. The situation changed following the adoption of 
REACH in 2006. Shortly after its enactment, Swedish 
authorities decided to submit DEHP to the authorization 
procedure.
The authorization procedure has two major steps. The 
first is for national authorities to declare a chemical to 
be of “very high concern”, mainly on the grounds of its 
classification and of the number of tonnes produced. 
After being placed on the “candidate list subject to 
authorization”, the most toxic of these molecules may 
be made “subject to authorization”. They are then prohi-
bited from being placed on the market unless there 
is a precise authorization granted case by case. The 
second step is for the firms that would like to continue 
using one of these molecules to request an authori-
zation from the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA), 
which is in charge of applying REACH. The firm filing a 
request can hope to be authorized to continue using the 
molecule but for a stated use and a limited time. This 
procedure was applied to DEHP.
Following the demand from Swedish authorities in 
June 2008, DEHP was declared a “substance of very 
high concern (SVHC)”. As of 2009, the committee of 
the member states of the ECHA placed it among the 
first chemicals to be “subject to authorization”. Since 
February 2015, this molecule may not be placed on the 
market without an authorization. Several big firms are 
affected by this listing of DEHP as a substance subject 
to authorization. Anticipating this decision, Arkema, a 
French chemical firm and one of the major European 
manufacturers of DEHP, filed in August 2013 two 
requests with the ECHA for authorizations to use DEHP 
to make articles in PVC.(8) On the basis of socioeco-
nomic data and information provided by the firm about 
its risk-management measures, Arkema obtained the 
authorization to use this chemical but only for the uses 
declared in the authorization and for a period limited to 
four years.
By setting conditions, the “regulatory horizon,” in parti-
cular a time limit beyond which a toxic substance may 
no longer be used, REACH has avoided the pitfall of 
the EPA’s asbestos ban. Whereas the TSCA foresees 
an outright prohibition on the most dangerous chemi-
cals, without any possibility for a dispensation, REACH 
provides for an authorization procedure. A chemical 
subject to authorization may continue being placed on 
the market for a given use and time on condition that 
a firm files a request and manages to prove that it has 
implemented suitable risk-management measures or 
that the socioeconomic analysis submitted in its request 
contains adequate grounds for temporarily keeping the 
substance on the market.
(8)  Arkema, Application for authorization for Bis (2-ethylhexyl) 
phthalate (DEHP) for industrial use in polymer processing by 
calendering, spread coating, extrusion, injection moulding to 
produce PVC articles except erasers, sex toys, small household 
items (<10cm) that can be swallowed by children, clothing 
intended to be worn against the bare skin; also toys, cosmetics 
and food contact material (restricted under other EU regulations), 
2013.
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By focusing on the properties and uses of chemicals, 
this authorization procedure allows for numerous 
“special” cases. As a result, regulatory authorities are 
in a “hybrid” position that can be reduced neither to 
simply finding a solution to a purely regulatory requi-
rement nor to fully delegating to private interests the 
power to organize the chemicals market (BOULLIER & 
LAURENT 2015).
Furthermore, REACH provides for many exemptions. 
The authorization procedure does not, for example, 
apply to imported goods, not even if they contain 
substances subject to authorization. This is very often 
the case for phtalates, which enter into the composi-
tion of many products manufactured outside the EU. 
Another exemption concerns European manufacturers 
who export their goods outside the EU. Since the autho-
rization procedure requires the manufacturer to state a 
“use” for placing a chemical on the European market, 
exporting firms benefit from the fact that the substance 
in question has no use on the European market since all 
goods containing it are exported. As a consequence, a 
firm that makes phtalates and exports all its production 
outside the EU is not concerned by the authorization 
procedure. Despite these exemptions, the authorization 
procedure allows for prohibiting molecules — something 
that no previous regulatory policy had achieved.
Prohibition through authorization: A new form of 
regulation
Unlike previous regulatory procedures, despite their 
pretensions and the adoption of the TSCA in the 1970s, 
REACH manages to exercise control over chemicals. 
The deployment of its authorization procedure corres-
ponds to a new “form of regulation” (GAUDILLIÈRE & 
JOLY 2006). Borrowing John Pickstone’s (2001) “ways 
of knowing”, Jean-Paul Gaudillière and Volker Hess 
(2012) have described five forms of regulation (profes-
sional, administrative, industrial, juridical and public) 
that were applied to therapeutic agents during the 
20th century. For a long time, the control of substances 
produced by the chemical industry was an adminis-
trative type of regulation, which assigns most tasks of 
expertise and control to government agencies.
While clearly providing for interventions by regula-
tory authorities, REACH adds objectives related to 
profit-making and productivity to the requirement of 
protecting human health. It thus comes close to being 
a regulation of an industrial type, in which firms clearly 
play a key role. In the EU, this change can be observed 
at the level of the authorization procedure. To describe 
how this shift involves firms in the production of regula-
tory know-how during the decision-making process, 
Table 1 epitomizes the characteristics of procedures 
for controlling risky chemicals. To understand how the 
authorization procedure works, I would like to point out 
how the characteristics presented in this table follow on, 
and rectify, previous policies of prohibition, such as the 
one under the TSCA in the United States.
REACH differs in intent and scope from most previous 
regulatory policies, including the TSCA. In particular, 
it claims to make the protection of human health and 
the environment compatible with the improvement of 
the European chemical industry’s competitive advan-
tage. The TSCA’s intent and scope are quite different. 
Lacking power over chemicals already on the market 
(such as asbestos), the US act focuses on controlling 
new chemicals. It is a coercive policy. Insofar as the EPA 
fails to obtain data on the uses of potentially dangerous 
chemicals already on the market, controls are limited to 
requests concerning new chemicals or new uses. Prior 
to 2006, the European regulatory framework was much 
the same: directives and regulations mainly concerned 
new chemicals. Under REACH’s authorization proce-
dure, the decision to prohibit a chemical is easier to 
make since it does not take effect right away but at the 
end of the period during which the chemical is autho-
rized for certain uses.
Whereas existing chemicals were, prior to its adoption, 
subject to few or no controls, REACH distinguishes 
between substances and their uses. This new approach, 
enshrined in the authorization procedure, alters the 
division of labor between regulatory authorities and 
firms. Authorities have the job of selecting the chemi-
cals to be prohibited; they single them out (DODIER 
1993) by declaring them to be of “very high concern” 
and destined for the list “subject to authorization”. The 
Earlier procedures  
(as under the TSCA) REACH’s authorization procedure
Intent and scope A coercive, restrictive policy. Narrowly defined 
prohibitions, irrevocable decisions.
Under a policy of “responsibility-making”, authoriza-
tions for temporary, specified uses.
What to control New chemicals to be placed on the market. Chemicals 
already on the market are subject to few or no controls.
The prohibition of all toxic substances but with the 
possibility of temporary authorizations.
Data A heavy burden on the administration: for want of 
toxiocological data, few prohibitions are pronounced.
A chemical is listed as “subject to authorization” on 
the basis of its danger. When filing a request for an 
authorization, the firm must submit socioeconomic 
data and information on the uses of the chemical.
Regulatory know-how The grounds for prohibiting a toxic substance are 
toxicological data.
The creation of lists.
Various sorts of know-how arise out of a collaboration 
between public authorities and manufacturers.
Table 1: Regulating chemicals before and after REACH
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firms that want to continue using these chemicals must 
file requests to explain why certain “uses” should be 
temporarily authorized.
Previous procedures required information on toxic 
substances that regulatory authorities themselves 
had to provide. This imposed so heavy a burden 
on the administration that few prohibitions could be 
pronounced. Under REACH, authorities use the general 
information available to pronounce a prohibition. It is 
now possible to prohibit a dangerous substance even 
“without data”, i.e., without any detailed data on it.(9) In 
effect, the data on the uses of toxic molecules and on 
their economic benefits are provided by a firm when it 
requests an authorization.
Previously, a decision to prohibit an existing chemical 
was based on a risk-assessment, but relevant toxico-
logical data were not always available. Under REACH, 
such data are no longer the key evidence used to 
decide whether it is necessary to take dangerous 
chemicals off the market. Under the authorization 
procedure, attention is also given to both the chemical’s 
socioeconomic benefits and the time needed for R&D 
to invent a substitute. Knowledge is constructed by 
firms, along with authorities, during a process of 
collaboration for the purpose of gradually prohibiting 
dangerous chemicals (starting with those for which 
substitutes exist). In effect, most molecules classified 
“subject to authorization” are old chemicals that are 
now being replaced.
Conclusion
We have explored the hypothesis of a shift from an 
administrative type of control of high risk chemicals to 
an industrial form of regulation, wherein firms play a key 
role.
The history of the US Toxic Substances Control Act 
of 1976 — one of the most ambitious policies for 
controlling chemicals that has ever been imagined — 
has been reviewed. The thorny negotiations leading 
to its adoption stripped the TSCA of provisions for 
placing the burden of proof on manufacturers. Given 
the asymmetry of information that long prevailed in the 
regulation of chemical substances, the EPA was unable 
to prohibit toxic molecules. Its failure in prohibiting 
asbestos marked the end of any attempt by this federal 
agency to outlaw existing chemicals.
The intent of REACH’s authorization procedure is to 
settle problems by granting regulatory authorities the 
power to prohibit certain dangerous molecules in spite 
of this asymmetry of information. These substances are 
now made “subject to authorization” on the grounds 
of their general properties, but they may be tempora-
rily authorized for certain uses, on condition that the 
request filed by a firm for an authorization be accepted.
(9)  In the words of a representative of the Ministry of Ecology 
during an interview in September 2012. As this phrase implies, 
a chemical may be made subject to authorization without any 
new data, since chemicals are singled out on the basis of generic 
classificatory criteria. 
Given that REACH assigns firms a strong position 
(BOULLIER 2016b), questions arise about this reconfi-
guration of the relationship between regulatory authori-
ties and firms and of the “ways of knowing” under the 
authorization procedure. In any case, the authorization 
procedure signals a break with the past: managing 
dangerous chemicals no longer entails hurriedly making 
a data base with exhaustive information from relevant 
scientific studies and all tests on exposure levels 
(and related risks) and about all manufacturing 
processes so as to be able, at last, to decide, with full 
knowledge of the facts, whether to prohibit a substance. 
The chemicals listed as “subject to authorization” 
are well-known, everyday products. Our attitudes toward 
them are ambivalent. We know they are dangerous 
but they are part of everyday life. The framework of the 
authorization procedure is clearly defined: molecules 
with known dangers are to be withdrawn from the 
market gradually, as substitutes are introduced, so as 
not to upend industry or disrupt our way of life.
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